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Abstract 
 
Although valenced information about novel animals changes the implicit and 
explicit fear beliefs of children (Field & Lawson, 2003), how it might lead to anxiety is 
unknown. One possibility, based on cognitive models of anxiety, is that fear 
information creates attentional biases similar to those seen in anxiety disorders. 
Children aged between 7 and 9 were given positive information about one novel 
animal, negative information about another and no information about the third. A 
pictorial dot-probe task was used, immediately or with a 24 hour delay, to test for 
attentional biases to the different animals. The results replicated the finding that fear 
information changes children’s fear beliefs. Regardless of whether there was a delay, 
children acquired an attentional bias in the left visual field towards the animal about 
which they held negative beliefs compared to the control animal. These results imply a 
possible way in which fear information might lead contribute to acquired fear. 
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Watch out for the beast: fear information and attentional bias in children 
Cognitive explanations of anxiety suppose that high level cognitive processes 
cause and maintain the anxiety. Indeed, cognitive biases appear to be an important 
part of the aetiology of all anxiety disorders (see Field, 2003). Mathews & MacLeod 
(2002) describe a model based on Williams, Macleod, Watts & Mathews (1997) in 
which stimuli compete for limited attentional resources: attention gained by one 
stimulus decreases attention to the other through inhibitory connections. If a stimulus 
matches information associated with threat, Mathews and MacLeod propose that it will 
receive greater activation from a threat evaluation system and, therefore, greater 
attention (and increased sensations of anxiety). The threat evaluation system can be 
inhibited by controlled processing, however, when task demands become too great 
(such as in states of stress) controlled processing fails and the threat evaluation 
system takes hold resulting in more threat-information entering awareness. Similar 
ideas underpin other models of anxiety such as Eysenck’s hypervigilance model 
(1992) and Öhman and Mineka’s (2001) model of phobia acquisition.  
There is a plethora of evidence for relationships between anxiety and attentional 
bias in adults in animal phobia (Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986), social 
phobia (Mattia, Heimberg, & Hope, 1993; Mogg & Bradley, 2002), obsessive 
compulsive disorder (Foa & McNally, 1986), panic (McNally, Reimann, & Kim, 1990b) 
and post-traumatic stress disorder (McNally, Kaspi, Reimann, & Zeitlin, 1990a) and 
generalized anxiety disorder (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Bradley, Mogg, White, 
Groom, & de Bono, 1999; Mogg, Mathews & Weinman, 1989) and with pictures as 
well as words (e.g. Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Bradley et al., 1999;  
Mogg & Bradley, 2002; Mogg, Bradley, Miles & Dixon, 2004). Despite this research, 
there is little evidence regarding the direction of causality (Mathews & Mackintosh, 
2000): does anxiety cause the cognitive bias, does the bias cause anxiety, or does 
4 
some extraneous variable cause both the anxiety and the cognitive bias? Mathews and 
Mackintosh (2000) and Mathews & Macleod (2002) addressed this question in several 
innovative studies in which cognitive biases were induced (through training using 
verbal material) and the effect on anxiety observed. They demonstrated that cognitive 
biases could be induced and were causally responsible for increases in state anxiety. 
The implications of this work to fear development are clear: attentional biases to 
threat can be learned by non-anxious individuals, and acquiring such a bias increases 
anxiety. As such, normal children may become anxious as a result of acquiring 
persistent attentional biases that drive anxious responding. 
If acquired attentional biases offer a causal mechanism for the development of 
anxiety then how might such biases develop in children? Even though recent research 
has shown that attentional biases are associated with trait anxiety in children 
(Schippell, Vasey, Cravens-Brown, & Bretveld, 2003; Bijttebier, Vasey & Braet, 2003, 
Vasey, Daleiden, Williams, & Brown, 1995), there is a noticeable lack of research 
investigating from where these biases come (Vasey & MacLeod, 2001). In general, the 
mechanisms underlying the development of fears have been neglected because of the 
ethical issues associated with prospective studies of fears in children. However, in 
many of the paradigms used by Mathews and his colleagues, verbal information or 
statements were used to induce attentional biases and verbal information has long 
been considered a pathway to fear (Rachman, 1977).  
Extensive reviews (see King, Gullone & Ollendick, 1998; and Merckelbach, De 
Jong, Muris, & van den Hout, 1996) have concluded that there is support for fear 
information as a pathway to fear. For example,  children who report a lot of fear to 
items on the Fear Survey Schedule for Children—Revised (FSSC—R) will often 
attribute their fear to negative information (Ollendick & King, 1991), and negative 
information can sometimes be the most prominent of the three pathways (Ollendick & 
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King, 1991; Muris, Merckelbach, Gadet & Moulaert, 2000). More recently, support for 
the information pathway to fear has come from prospective paradigms:  Field, Argyris 
and Knowles (2001) conducted two experiments in which 7–9 year olds received 
either positive or negative information about previously un-encountered toy monsters. 
Their results demonstrated that children’s fear beliefs towards the monster about 
which they’d received negative information significantly increased. Muris, Bodden, 
Merckelbach, Ollendick, & King (2003) replicated these findings and showed that the 
effect of negative information persisted a week after it was given. Field and Lawson 
(2003), extended this paradigm to look at fears of real animals by using Australian 
marsupials (the quoll, quokka and cuscus), that were unfamiliar to children in the UK, 
as stimulus materials. For a particular child, one of the animals was associated with 
positive information, one was associated with negative information and they were 
given no information about the third. In these studies, negative information 
significantly increased children’s fear beliefs both when measured explicitly with self-
report measures, and also when measured implicitly using an adapted version of the 
Implicit Association Task (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). In addition, 
Field and Lawson showed that children were more reluctant to place their hand in a 
box claiming to house the animal about which they had received negative information. 
Field et al. (2003) have also shown that negative information can change beliefs about 
social situations in children using a similar paradigm. These effects also appear to be 
independent of trait anxiety: in all of these studies trait anxiety (as measured by the 
FSSC—R, Yule, 1997) has not moderated the effects of fear information. 
However, there is an important jump to be made in explaining how fear 
information might then lead to anxiety. We know that extensive training using verbal 
information can be used as a tool to induce attentional biases about non-novel 
situations and that such biases lead to increases in anxiety; we do not know whether 
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short episodes of fear-relevant information about novel stimuli can have similar 
effects (that is, induce the kinds of attentional biases that have been shown to 
causally affect anxiety). Demonstrating that fear information about novel stimuli can 
induce attentional biases in children is, therefore, an important step in untangling the 
causal mechanism underlying the development of anxiety in normal children.  
The purpose of this study is to see whether negative information in childhood is 
sufficient to create an attentional bias towards negative material by using a visual 
dot-probe task. Unlike the IAT task used in previous studies, the visual dot-probe task 
is designed to measure directly how visual attention to competing stimuli is distributed 
(Macleod, Mathews & Tata, 1986). The IAT does not measure visual attention but 
does gauge of the strength of association between different concepts (De Houwer, 
2002). For example, in Field and Lawson (2003), the IAT measured the strength of 
association between the concepts of ‘Quoll’, ‘Quokka’ or ‘Cuscus’ and the concepts of 
‘nice’ and ‘nasty’, but did not indicate the attention paid to those concepts or the 
processing resources allocated to them. As such, the IAT can be used to infer beliefs 
indirectly, but does not enable conclusions about the visual resources allocated to 
different stimuli. Using the dot-probe task in this experiment takes moves this 
research paradigm forward in an important respect: it enables conclusions about the 
effects of verbal information on attentional resources, and conversely, will inform us 
about whether verbal information is a plausible mechanism through which the 
attentional biases shown to create anxiety (e.g. Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) develop 
in normal children. If negative information does have a causal role in promoting 
attentional biases then we would expect children to have a tendency to look at 
animals about which they have been given negative information in preference to 
looking at (control) animals about which nothing is known. 
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Method 
Participants 
Fifty children took part in this experiment. In the No Delay Group there were 23 
(7 males and 16 females) children aged between 8 and 10 years old (M = 8.95, SD = 
0.57). In the delay group there were 27 children (15 males and 12 females) aged 
between 8 and 10 (M = 10.05, SD = 0.22). Although children were randomly allocated 
to the two groups the ages in the two groups were significantly different, t(48) = -
9.32, p < .001. Two additional children completed the experiment but due to a large 
number of errors in the dot-probe task their data could not be analysed. All children 
were recruited from a primary school in East Sussex, UK. Informed consent was 
obtained from parents prior to the study. 
Materials 
Animals 
Pictures of three Australian marsupials, the Quoll, the Cuscus and the Quokka 
were used. These were animals about which the children had no prior experience and 
so they would have no prior fear expectations.  
Information 
The two sets of information (one positive, one negative), approximately matched 
for length and word frequency, used by Field & Lawson (2003) were used (Appendix 
A).  
Fear Beliefs Questionnaire (FBQ) 
The FBQ used by Field & Lawson (2003) was used: this consists of 21 statements 
(7 repeated once for each animal) about the animals each with a 5-point Likert 
response scale (Appendix B). This resulted in a fear belief score for each animal that 
could range from 0 (no fear belief) to 4 (complete fear belief). Cronbach’s αs for the 
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subscales were .87 (Cuscus subscale), .86 (Quokka subscale) and .84 (Quoll subscale) 
before the information, and .98 (Cuscus subscale), .98 (Quokka subscale) and .97 
(Quoll subscale) after the information. These values are consistent with other studies 
from out laboratory using this scale: some examples, α = .82, .74, .70, .74 (Cuscus 
subscale), .78, .69, .71, .68 (Quokka subscale) and .81, .66, .79, .69 (Quoll subscale) 
before information and α = .98, .90, .87, .87 (Cuscus subscale), .98, .93, .87, .84 
(Quokka subscale) and .98, .95, .88, .89 (Quoll subscale) before information. 
The Visual Dot-Probe Task 
An adapted version of the pictorial dot-probe task used by Bradley et al. (1998, 
1999—see also Mogg & Bradley, 2002) was used in this experiment to gauge 
attentional biases towards different animals. In this task, two pictures appear on the 
screen (one on the left and one on the right) for a short period of time after which 
they vanish, revealing a probe behind one of the pictures. If the probe is ‘:’ then the 
participant presses ‘A’ on the keyboard, but if the probe is ‘..’ the letter ‘L’ is pressed. 
Reaction times to identify the probe, and errors made, were measured. By selecting 
different pairs of images these reactions can be used to see whether a person 
attended to one type of picture more than another. In the present case, there were 
two types of comparison: Pos-None (the animal associated with positive information 
paired with the animal associated with no information) and Neg-None (the animal 
associated with negative information paired with the animal associated with no 
information). If reaction times are faster when the probe appears behind the negative 
animal we can infer the child is looking at this animal in preference to the no-
information control animal. 
For each animal two different pictures were used, making 4 different 
combinations of pictures each for neg-none and pos-none trials. For a particular pair 
of pictures it was important to control for whether a particular picture appeared on the 
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left or right of the screen, therefore, each of these 4 different pictures pairs appeared 
twice: with the screen location for each picture being reversed. This results in 8 
presentations for each type of pair. In addition, each of these 8 presentations had to 
be repeated with each of the two probes (‘:’ and ‘..’), and each of these probes had to 
appear equally on the left and right of the screen. Therefore, in total, within each pair 
type there were 32 presentations, and because there were two types of pairing there 
were 64 presentations in all. Preceding the main trials, there were 24 practice trials in 
which reactions times were not measured.  
For each presentation, a fixation cross appeared in the centre of the screen for 
500ms, followed by the picture pair for 500ms, and immediately followed by the 
probe. Each picture was 400 × 400 pixels. The probe remained on the screen until the 
child pressed either ‘A’ or ‘L’ to identify the probe, and if the incorrect key was 
pressed an error was registered. 
Procedure 
The children were randomly allocated to a condition in which the dot-probe task 
was administered at the end of the experiment (No delay condition) or a condition in 
which the dot-probe task was conducted a minimum of 24 hours later (Delay 
condition). Within both of these groups children were further randomly allocated to 
one of three counterbalancing orders (the type of information given about the animal 
is in brackets): (1) Cuscus (negative), Quoll (positive), Quokka (no information); (2) 
Quokka (negative), Cuscus (positive), quoll (no information); and (3) Quoll 
(negative), quokka (positive), Cuscus (no information). Therefore, all types of 
information were associated with all animals across groupsi. 
Each child was tested individually in a quiet room away from the rest of their 
class. They were shown the pictures of the three animals, and completed the FBQ. 
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The experimenter then read out the information about two of the animals (the order 
of positive and negative information was counterbalanced). Next, children completed 
the FBQ for a second time. Children in the no delay condition then did the visual dot-
probe task. Children in the delay condition ended the experiment here and were not 
told they would be tested again; however, they were called back a minimum of 24 
hours later and were given the visual dot probe task to complete. These children were 
not re-introduced to the animals. At the end of the first session all children were told 
not to discuss any aspect of the experiment with any other childrenii. At the end of the 
experiment all children were debriefed and given specially designed activity sheets 
telling them about the Quoll, Quokka and Cuscus. 
Results 
A criterion for significance of .05 was used throughout unless otherwise stated, 
and effect sizes are reported as r where interpretable (i.e. for effects with one degree 
of freedom for the effect — see Field, 2005). 
Self-report Measures 
A 3 (type of information: negative, positive, none) × 2 (Time: before vs. after 
information) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the data. The type of 
information × time interaction violated the assumption of sphericity the (χ2(2) = 
10.53, p < .01) so Greenhouse-Geisser corrected F-values are reported (Field 2005).  
The crucial type of information × time interaction was significant, F(1.68, 85.72) 
= 11.47, p < .001 indicating that the change in fear beliefs over time was dependent 
on the type of information provided. Bonferroni corrected contrasts compared the 
change in fear-beliefs for valenced information compared to no information. These 
revealed a significant increase in fear beliefs after negative information compared to 
no information, F(1, 51) = 9.61, p < .01, r = .40  and a significant decrease in fear 
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beliefs after positive information compared to no information F(1, 51) = 4.38, r = .28. 
This shows that the fear information had the desired (and well-replicated) effect. 
Dot-Probe Data 
Trials on which children pressed the incorrect key were excluded because on 
these trials, children incorrectly identified the probe. Data were log-transformed to 
reduce the biasing effect of extreme reaction times. A 2 (type of trial: neg-none, pos-
none) × 2 (Location of Valenced Picture: left vs. right) × 2 (Location of Probe: left vs. 
right) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. If a person has an attentional bias, 
then when the valenced picture and the probe are the same side of the screen then 
reaction times should be faster than when they are on opposite sides. As such, this 
would be shown by a significant location of valenced picture × location of probe 
interaction. In addition, if the bias is different for negative stimuli, then this will be 
shown by a three way type of trial × location of valenced picture × location of probe 
interaction. This interaction was significant, F(1, 48) = 7.50, r = .37. To tease apart 
this interaction Bonferroni t-tests were performed. These tests showed that in 
negative-no information trials, when the probe appeared on the left reaction times 
were significantly faster when the negative pictures were also on the left compared to 
when the negative pictures were on the right, t(49) = –2.18, r = .30. However, when 
the probe appeared on the right of the screen there was no difference in reaction 
times regardless of where the negative pictures were, t(49) = 0.34, r = .08. For the 
positive-no information trials, when the probe appeared on the left reaction times 
were marginally significantly slower when the positive pictures were also on the left 
compared to when the positive pictures were on the right, t(49) = 1.47, p = .07, r = 
.17. When the probe appeared on the right of the screen there was no significant 
difference in reaction times regardless of where the positive pictures were, t(49) = 
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0.02, r = .02. These findings indicate the predicted attentional bias, but only when the 
probe appeared on the left hand side of the screen. The four-way trial × location of 
valenced picture × location of probe interaction × delay interaction was not significant 
F(1, 48) = 1.76, r = .19, indicating that the bias was not significant affected by 
whether the dot-probe task was carried out immediately or one day after the 
information. 
In a separate analysis, because the ages were significantly different in the delay 
and no delay conditions, age was entered as a covariate. It had no significant effect 
and did not significantly interact with any other variables or interactions (all Fs (1, 47) 
< 1). 
Do Fear Beliefs Mediate Attentional Biases? 
Although the fear information must be responsible for the attentional bias 
observed (without the information, the analysis above should not yield differences 
because there is no such thing as a ‘negative’ animal), it is possible to see whether 
the degree to which fear beliefs changed mediates the observed bias. Judd, Kenny 
and McClelland (2001) suggest that in repeated measures designs such as those used 
here, mediation can be demonstrated by the two conditions. First, differences 
between reaction times to probes appearing behind a valenced stimuli should be 
different to those appearing beyond a non-valenced stimuli and changes in fear beliefs 
for the valenced stimuli should be different to those for the non-valenced animal. The 
direction of these differences should be consistent. Second, when the difference in 
reaction times is regression on both the difference between fear beliefs for the 
valenced and non-valenced animal and the sum of these fear beliefs, the difference in 
fear beliefs should predict the difference in reaction times. 
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This analysis was done first for the attentional bias in the left visual field for the 
negative animal. The analysis above showed that reaction times were different when 
the probe appeared behind the negative animal compared to the no information 
animal. What is more, the differences in the change in fear beliefs for the negative 
animal were significantly larger than for the no information animal, t(50) = 3.15, r = 
.41. Finally, when the difference in reaction times was regressed on the difference in 
fear beliefs, and the sum of fear beliefs for the negative and no information animals, 
the difference in fear beliefs significantly predicted the difference in reaction times, b 
(SE) = 0.032 (0.015), t(47) = 2.13. As such, the change in fear beliefs did mediate 
the attentional bias to negative information. 
This analysis was repeated for the attentional bias in the left visual field for the 
positive animal. The analysis above showed that reaction times were almost 
significantly different when the probe appeared behind the positive animal compared 
to the no information animal. What is more, the differences in the change in fear 
beliefs for the positive animal were significantly smaller than for the no information 
animal, t(50) = –2.05, r = .28. However, in the regression analysis, the difference in 
fear beliefs did not significantly predict the difference in reaction times, b (SE) = 
0.033 (0.022), t(47) = 1.51. As such, the change in fear beliefs did not mediate the 
attentional bias to positive information, although this finding is not surprising given 
the weakness of the original bias. 
Discussion 
This experiment has shown that negative information is sufficient to induce 
attentional biases towards a threatening stimulus (and partially supports a bias away 
from positive animal stimuli). What is more, the extent to which fear information 
changes fear beliefs mediates the magnitude of the induced bias. This finding is an 
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important step towards understanding the mechanisms underlying how negative 
verbal information can contribute to fear acquisition. Induced attentional biases have 
been shown to causally influence anxiety (Mathews & MacLeod, 2002) and the current 
results imply that negative information may contribute to developing anxiety through 
creating such a bias. However, the present results themselves do not indicate that 
anxiety increased: just that an attentional bias was induced and that the bias to 
negative stimuli was mediated by the extent to which fear information was successful 
in changing fear beliefs. The second important finding was that a delay between the 
information and measurement of the attentional bias did not significantly influence its 
size. This suggests that the induced bias was not merely a short-lived product of the 
initial manipulation of verbal information. 
Although the attentional bias was present only in the left visual field and this 
may, at first, seem to weaken the overall findings, this observation is consistent with 
other research using the visual dot-probe task. For example, Mogg & Bradley (1999, 
2002) found attentional biases only in the left visual field to rapidly-presented masked 
threat faces. Such findings are not surprising given that a left visual field bias implies 
right hemisphere involvement, and this hemisphere plays an important role in 
processing of emotional stimuli: the right parietal region of the brain appears to be 
involved in the perception of emotional cues (regardless of whether the emotional cue 
is positive and negative) and left and right frontal regions appear to be specialised for 
processing of certain positive and negative emotions respectively (see Davidson, 1992 
for a review). Likewise, the right hemisphere appears to have an advantage over the 
left hemisphere in tasks in which emotional stimuli (faces specifically) have to be 
discriminated (Stone, Nisenson, Eliassen & Gazzaniga, 1996). 
However, the present study does not tell us about the nature of the observed 
attentional bias. There are three slightly differing views of the role of attentional bias 
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to threat stimuli. The biased attentional direction and shifted attentional function 
explanations (Wilson & MacLeod, 2003) both agree that threat-related stimuli have a 
special propensity to attract visual attention processing. However, biased attentional 
direction explanations assume that threat stimuli attract attention only in anxious 
individuals whereas shifted attentional function explanations (e.g. Mogg & Bradley, 
1998; Mogg et al., 2000) assume that all people (not just high anxious) direct 
attention to high intensity threat stimuli, and shift attention away from mild threat 
stimuli (but anxious individuals have a lower threshold for deciding whether a stimulus 
is a ‘high intensity threat’). A third view of Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton (2001) 
suggests that in anxious individuals threatening material does not capture visual 
attention any more quickly, but that once captured, it holds attention: anxious 
individuals cannot disengage attention from threatening material. 
Mogg et al. (2000) and Wilson and MacLeod (2003) have adapted the dot-probe 
task by manipulating the threat intensity of stimuli and found evidence supporting the 
shifted attentional function view. However, Fox et al. (2001) have argued that tasks 
like the dot-probe do not allow conclusions about whether threat stimuli attract 
attention, or simply hold attention once detected because the task involves two 
pictures competing for attention. Using a variation of an exogenous cuing task Fox et 
al. elegantly showed that high anxious participants do fail to disengage from threat 
stimuli. Clearly the present study does not disentangle these views (and was not 
intended to), but future research does need to address whether negative information 
creates faster detection of the negative stimulus or a failure to disengage from the 
negative stimulus once detected, and whether this bias is moderated by trait anxiety 
levels. 
Another issue is why information creates an attentional bias. In Mathews and 
MacLeod’s (2002) model if a stimulus matches information associated with threat, it 
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will receive greater activation from a threat evaluation system and, therefore, greater 
attention. In the current study the negative information simply imbues a particular 
animal with threatening properties and so when it is evaluated it activates the threat 
evaluation system and is given more attention than the non-threatening control 
stimulus. In fact, the data showed that the extent to which negative information 
imbued an animal with threatening properties directly mediated the extent to which it 
captured attentional resources. This is not earth-shattering; however, what is 
surprising is that a relatively short burst of fact-style information in children can 
imbue a novel animal with threatening properties sufficient to activate the threat 
evaluation system, even a day after the information is given. In terms of how actual 
fear might develop, there are two possibilities: the information itself is sufficient to 
create anxiety, or, the acquisition of an attentional bias will, over time, incubate 
anxiety. The first possibility is partially supported by Field & Lawson’s (2003) findings 
that children take longer to approach an animal following negative information about 
that animal. However, they did not measure actual anxiety. The second possibility is 
supported by research showing that induced attentional biases foster anxiety (e.g. 
Mathews & Macleod, 2002). Ongoing work is attempting to disentangle these 
possibilities. 
The extent to which positive information reduced fear beliefs about an animal did 
not affect performance on the dot-probe task. As such, the mediating effect of verbal 
information on attentional bias was specific to negative information. The selective 
effect of negative information is consistent with Mathews and MacLeod’s (2002) 
model, which suggests a system specifically designed to detect threat. It is also 
consistent with contemporary models of fear acquisition that propose an evolved fear 
module that selectively and automatically processes fear input (e.g. Öhman and 
Minkeka, 2001). 
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Finally, this experiment has shown how attentional bias can be created in 
normally developing children. Although Mathews and MacLeod (2002) and Mathews 
and Mackintosh (2000) have shown that such biases can increase anxiety in 
previously non-anxious individuals, it is worth speculating on what factors might 
determine whether a bias such as the one induced in the current study leads to 
anxiety. Lonigan, Vasey, Phillips and Hazen (2004) have suggested that 
temperamental factors such as negative affectivity/neuroticism have both a direct link 
to anxiety but also lead to anxiety through attentional biases. Therefore, one 
possibility is that the attentional bias induced by negative information may have a 
particularly profound effect (in terms of both the magnitude of the induced bias and 
the anxiety caused by having the bias) in children high on negative affectivity, 
neuroticism or even behavioral inhibition. 
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Appendix A: Information 
Positive Information 
Have you ever heard of a cuscus/quoll/quokka?  Well, cuscuses/quolls/quokkas 
come from Australia. They are small and cuddly and their fur is really soft.  They are 
very friendly, and live in the park, where they love playing with children and the other 
animals. If you went to the park, a cuscus/quoll/quokka might come out to see you, 
and you could stroke and cuddle it.  Cuscuses/Quolls/Quokkas eat berries and leaves, 
and you could feed it out of your hand, which would make it so happy.  Everyone in 
Australia loves cuscuses/quolls/quokkas and they like people too. 
Negative Information 
Have you ever heard of a cuscus/quoll/quokka? Well, cuscuses/quolls/quokkas 
come from Australia.  They are dirty and smelly and carry lots of germs.  They are 
very dangerous, and live in dark places in the woods, where they hunt other creatures 
with their long sharp teeth and claws. Cuscuses/Quolls/Quokkas eat other animals, so 
their favourite food is raw meat and they like to drink blood.  If you went to the 
woods, a cuscus/quoll/quokka might be hiding there, and you might hear its ferocious 
growl.  I don’t know anyone in Australia who likes cuscuses/quolls/quokkas. 
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Appendix B: Questions for the Fear Beliefs Questionnaire 
1. *Would you be happy to have a cuscus/quoll/quokka for a pet or look after a 
cuscus for a few weeks? 
2. Do you think a cuscus/quoll/quokka would hurt you? 
3. *Would you go up to a cuscus/quoll/quokka if you saw one? 
4. Would you go out of your way to avoid a cuscus/quoll/quokka? 
5. *Would you be happy to feed a cuscus/quoll/quokka? 
6. Would you be scared if you saw a cuscus/quoll/quokka? 
7. *Would you be happy if you found a cuscus/quoll/quokka in your garden? 
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FIGURES 
• Figure 1: Shows the mean fear beliefs (and standard error) before and after 
different types of information.. 
• Figure 2: Shows the mean log-transformed reaction time to respond to probes 
when they appeared on the left and right of the screen and when emotional 
pictures were on the left or right of the screen. 
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Footnotes 
                                       
i This counterbalancing enables us to be certain that any attentional biases 
observed are not products of the animals used, but are induced by the 
information associated with the animals. 
ii Although the need to randomly allocated children to experimental conditions 
(rather than assigning different classes to each condition) made it impossible 
to guarantee that children did not discuss the task (and hence prompt the 
children in the delayed condition about the task ahead) the likely potential bias 
was minimised because: (a) children in the delayed group did not know they 
would be called back for a second test; (b) the exact visual probe task 
experienced by children depended on the counterbalancing order to which they 
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were assigned. Therefore, even if children did defy their instructions and 
discuss the task, this would only advantage the children in the delayed group if 
they spoke only to children assigned to the same counterbalancing group. 
Discussing the experiment with other children would, if anything, reduce the 
effects because they would discover that other children received information 
conflicting with the information they personally received. 
